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Abstract. This article describes a psychology that seems to pertain to United States (US) policy towards 
decreasing the export of illicit drugs from Colombia. 
 
US President Clinton's visit to Colombia was intended to provide impetus for a grand new initiative, 
"Plan Colombia," that among other things is to successfully confront and attenuate many of the 
components of the festering illicit drug problem. However, a close look at the goals of the Plan and US 
support for it suggests that nothing is grand or new. 
 
One aspect of the Plan and US support is to effect local elections in the southern provinces as well as 
judicial reform nation-wide. Both might possibly reinforce a pro forma perspective that the Colombian 
government is increasingly in control of these provinces. However, elections and judicial reform--as has 
been the case with past elections--seem destined to have little salient effect on de facto rebel and 
trafficker operations. Most often, the positive potential of elections and reform in such situations has 
been and can be too easily subverted by facts on the ground. 
 
Another aspect is to improve the human rights record of the armed forces. This improvement has 
instrumental weaknesses against an adversary with no such restraints even as it might secure the ethical 
and moral high ground from the point of view of human rights organizations. Moreover, human rights 
requirements and hopes are being waived in the service of the instrumental by the US executive branch. 
 
An additional aspect is to significantly increase military and police efforts against rebels and traffickers. 
However, the commitment of treasure, political will, and loss of life to emerge victorious is just not 
there and, perhaps, could not be because of the fungible nature of illicit drug production and trafficking. 
 
Yet another aspect is to provide jobs for refugees and promote alternative development projects for 
coca-growing peasants. This is a reasonable idea in the abstract that runs to ground on the shoals of 
concrete fact. The point is that there does not seem to be an economically sustainable or viable process 
to develop and maintain attractive (from the point of view of the poor) economic alternatives to directly 
and indirectly supporting the rebels and engaging in coca growing. 
 
A psychopolitical analysis suggests that the most likely consequences of the Plan will comprise 
enrichment of Plan contractors, short-term political benefits for some political supporters, political 
cover for many allied with the rebels and traffickers, little if any effect on the amount and price (but, 
perhaps, an effect on the source) of illicit drugs hitting the streets of the US, and prolonging and possible 
exacerbation of a shooting war. Although a multi-modal approach including eradication, interdiction, 
and socioeconomic and political intervention continues to have significant policy appeal, as long as there 
is significant drug demand from the same rich country that purports to be the primary, illicit drug 
scourge, Plan Colombia is a plan only for failure. (See Cheurprakobkit, S. (2000). The drug situation in 
Thailand: The role of government and the police. Drug and Alcohol Review, 19, 17-26; Jarkik, M.E. 
(1990). The drug dilemma: Manipulating the demand. Science, 250, 387-392; Krauss, C. (August 29, 
2000). Clinton's Colombia trip said to herald new era in ties. The New York Times, p. A9; Morgan, P., 
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Wallack, L., Buchanan, D. (1988). Waging drug wars: Prevention strategy or politics as usual. Drugs and 
Society, 3, 99-124; Najam, N. (1997). Drug addiction: Are political and legal solutions effective? Journal 
of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 23, 89-94; Williams, C R., & Arrigo, B.A. Discerning the 
margins of constitutional encroachment: The drug courier profile in the airport milieu. American Journal 
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